

Chapter 6



AE2 in The Sea of Marmara and Her Loss; POW Camp

CHAPTER 6

- 6.1 First Day in the Sea of Marmara 26 April 1915
- 6.2 Second Day in the Marmara
- 6.3 Fourth and Fifth Days in the Marmara
- 6.4 Rendezvous with E14
- 6.5 Battle with Turkish Gunboat Sultanhisar
- 6.6 Scuttling and Sinking of AE2
- 6.7 Turkish Account of the Battle AE2 and Sultanhisar
- 6.8 Allied Submarine Successes and Losses After AE2
- 6.9 Impact of AE2 on the War
- 6.10 Informing the Next of Kin of the AE2 Loss
- 6.11 Capture and Initial Treatment of AE2 Crew
- 6.12 Interrogation of AE2 Officers
- 6.13 Arrival of POWs at Afion Kara Hissar
- 6.14 Stoker Imprisoned as Turkish Reprisal
- 6.15 Stoker's Two Escape Attempts
- 6.16 Harsh POW Conditions; Crew Escape Attempts
- 6.17 Four AE2 Crew Die in POW Camps

-
- 6.18 AE2 Crew Release 1918 and Subsequent Events
 - 6.19 Stoker's Subsequent Career
 - 6.20 Haggard's Subsequent Career and Australian Life
 - 6.21 AE2 Found 1998
 - 6.22 AE2 Joint Expedition and Survey 2007
 - 6.23 Further Joint Expedition and Survey 2014
 - 6.23.1 Operation Silent ANZAC
 - 6.23.2 Authorised Personnel of Project Silent ANZAC
 - 6.24 ANZAC Centenary Plans 2015

6.1 First Day in the Sea of Marmara 26 April 1915

After sending the famous wireless message that she had penetrated the Dardanelles, *AE2* passed the night of 25-26 April 1915 on the surface close to the southern shore. Rain fell steadily for much of the night and this fortunately reduced visibility, but even so there were two scares. In the first, a vessel passed close enough to force Stoker temporarily to stop the submarine's engines. About 3.00 a.m. the weather cleared and thankfully the cloud cover broke. It was still quite dark as the moon had already set. *AE2* dived and took half an hour to adjust her lost trim before her crew were ready to continue their passage into the Sea of Marmara.¹

About 4.00 a.m. on 26 April, *AE2* was proceeding on the surface up the Straits. Just before dawn Stoker sighted ships ahead and dived to attack. As soon as light permitted Stoker observed through the periscope two approaching warships—a small ship leading and a larger ship astern. The sea was glassy calm, forcing Stoker to approach with periscope down most of the time and calculate by dead reckoning how to manoeuvre the submarine for the attack and when to raise the periscope again. Finally, with the periscope trained on the port beam, he observed a ship in the line of sight. He immediately fired a torpedo from a port side tube, but the ship altered course and the torpedo failed to hit its target. Stoker describes it in the following words:

I then discovered I had fired at the leading ship and found it impossible to bring another tube to bear on the second ship (a battleship of either the Barbarossa or Turgood Reis Class) with reasonable chance of success. I therefore did not fire. I attribute this failure to the state of the sea and my personal error in overdoing an unseen attack.

This was a rather candid concession on Stoker's part. The theory of torpedo attack from an E Class was simple although its application was often difficult. Knowing when to fire a torpedo was solved by simple trigonometric principles. The captain knew the speed of the torpedo through the water and the course it would follow. He also knew the bearing of his target from periscope observation. To solve the problem and determine the amount of 'aim off' to allow for a moving target, the captain was required to estimate the course, speed and range of the target. At that time the calculation was done mainly by mental arithmetic and 'by eye' and in this skill lay the success or failure of an attack. The glassy calm water complicated Stoker's attack that morning by only allowing him to raise the periscope when he calculated it was approximately time to fire. If the periscope were raised too early, it would be observed

by the target ship, which would initiate avoiding action. If the periscope were raised too late he would miss the attack altogether. In this particular attack, after missing with the torpedo from his port beam tube, Stoker was faced with the problem of altering course 90 degrees to bring either the bow or stern tubes to bear on the second target before his chance passed. There was insufficient time for this, and so there does not seem much personal error attributable to Stoker in the conduct of this attack.

AE2 evaded the pursuing gunboat and continued through the Straits. Having examined the Gallipoli anchorage and found no ship worthy of attack, Stoker proceeded to the entrance of the Marmara. Drawn up across the head of the Strait, from shore to shore, was a vast number of fishing boats. Stoker thought they were there entirely on his account. He dived to 70 feet and passed underneath them safely, and in so doing accomplished his long-awaited aim of entering the Marmara.²

Now that they were finally through, *AE2*'s main task was to prevent enemy troops and supplies crossing the Marmara from the southern side to the northern Gallipoli Peninsula. About 9.30 a.m. Stoker sighted four ships ahead approaching separately on zig-zag courses. As *AE2* carried no gun, and had only eight torpedoes, of which two were already expended, the remaining torpedoes had to be carefully husbanded.

I had no intelligence as to the nature of the ships likely to be met, and these ships flew no flag. I considered that, until another submarine joined me in the Sea of Marmara, it was necessary to exercise great care in the expenditure of torpedoes. I therefore decided not to fire unless I was certain of troops being on board the enemy ship, and with this intention dived up close to the foremost ship—a tramp of about 2000 tons.

Passing about 200 yards abeam of her and offering a perfect torpedo shot, Stoker hesitated. There was no sign of troops or ammunition. But, as he passed under the stern of the tramp, she ran up her battle colours and opened rifle-fire at the periscope. This was a clever ploy by the Turkish ship, which knew the submarine would not attack non-belligerent shipping. Stoker was irritated at being duped. There would be no recurrence.³

AE2 manoeuvred towards the next adjacent ship and attacked at 400 yards with a torpedo from the starboard beam. The torpedo failed to hit. Whether the failure was due to mechanical failure of the torpedo or successful evasion by the Turkish ship is not known. Whatever the reason, the attack was over as Stoker was unable to get within range of the other two ships.

AE2 rose to the surface half an hour later and spent the remainder of the day on the surface charging her batteries, making good defects, enjoying the afternoon sun, and 'examining' fishing boats. Stoker's unorthodox method of examining fishing boats was to hoist the White Ensign and then steam up close to them. The effect was to put the fishermen in fear of their lives, and their importunities to Stoker not to attack were evidence of the strong impression made by the submarine. This was, of course, Stoker's objective as he wanted to broadcast the arrival of a British submarine in the Marmara as widely and forcefully as possible to disrupt Turkish sea communications carrying troops and supplies to the Gallipoli battle.

After dark *AE2* made her way close to the Gallipoli Peninsula shore in an endeavour to clear a wireless message to a ship just across the peninsula in the Gulf of Saros.⁴ They sent the message but received no reply but it was, indeed, received as set out in Chapter 5.

6.2 Second Day in the Marmara

In the moonlight *AE2* were sighted and fired upon by a patrol vessel but dived and got clear before the patrol vessel had determined their range. Whenever they rose to the surface throughout the night of 26 – 27 April they were repeatedly set upon by patrol craft and forced to dive. The want of a gun mounted on the casing proved a severe handicap. (They were fitted later to the submarines and were used to great effect in the campaign.) Stoker later learnt that six Turkish vessels had been deployed for the sole purpose of hunting and destroying *AE2*.

It would, of course, have been known to the patrol craft that the submarine would normally come to the surface by night to charge her depleted batteries and freshen the air in the boat. Disrupting that routine was vital to the harassment and sinking of the Allied boat. The Turks were successful in their efforts to disrupt the routine of the *AE2*. On one occasion, a Turkish patrol vessel was able to manoeuvre very close to *AE2* unobserved and as the submarine attempted to dive, the conning-tower hatch jammed. A light, needed to clear the obstruction, was observed by the patrol vessel, which opened fire. The coxswain, charged with the duty of clearing the jammed hatch, was adamant that the flash from the patrol boat's gun was so close that it scorched his eyebrows.⁵ But once again they avoided fire and dived safely.⁶ As dawn approached Stoker resumed the offensive.

At dawn on April 27, whilst still diving, sighted ship approaching from eastward, convoyed by two destroyers, one ahead of her and the other on starboard beam (estimated 1500 tons). Dived past leading destroyer and across bows of another one, and fired bow torpedo at ship—a beam shot, distance 300 yards. The torpedo’s engine failed to start, and destroyer, attempting to ram, precluded possibility of second shot.

The despair felt by the captain and crew can be imagined. This was an ideal position for an attack as the range and bearing were perfect—300 yards range with the target beam-on. It was almost impossible to miss. But the torpedo’s engine failed to start. Several moments later, Stoker could see it floating on the surface with the compressed air bubbling from the tail.⁷ Another defective torpedo was enormously disheartening for Stoker and his men.

There is some conflict as to what *AE2* did on the afternoon of 27 April. Stoker records in his official report,⁸ and in his book,⁹ that no further craft were sighted that day. On the other hand Wheat, while agreeing that the afternoon was spent on the surface, steaming around close to Marmara Island, records that they sighted some barges which they could not attack as their draught was too shallow for them to be hit by a torpedo. Wheat wrote:

In the afternoon we sighted three lighters being towed by a tug. We proceeded to within about 1000 yards of them and saw they were full of soldiers. We could do nothing but watch them. How we were longing to have a three pounder gun mounted.¹⁰

No other traffic was sighted that day. This was probably evidence as to the success of Stoker’s tactics in making his presence widely known. With the possibility of an unknown number of enemy submarines in the area, seaborne transportation of men and munitions had been severely curtailed by the Turks. In order to give the *AE2* crew some rest Stoker spent that night bottomed in Artaki Bay. They employed the usual routine of leaving one watch-keeper on duty while the rest turned in.

6.3 Fourth and Fifth Days in the Marmara

The events of the next day, 28 April 1915, are scantily recorded, but nonetheless involved two unsuccessful attacks by *AE2*. Stoker’s official report states:

On 28 April (a.m.) in dead calm weather attacked small ship convoyed by two destroyers. Fired starboard beam torpedo at 300 yards range. Torpedo failed to hit, and destroyer, attempting to ram, precluded chance of second shot. At dusk sighted two men o'war approaching at high speed from westward.

Dived to attack, but when near ships it was too dark to see anything but smoke of one of them. Judging her to be near, fired port torpedo, which failed to hit. Proceeded towards Gallipoli to reach nearest point to receiving ship in endeavour to get wireless connection.¹¹

That night an unknown ship signalled *AE2*'s call sign by light several times, presumably in an effort to get them either to answer or to investigate further.¹² As they knew of no other friendly ship in the Sea of Marmara they refused to reply. However, it was possible that the light signal was an attempt by Boyle in *E14* to contact them. The *E14* had sailed as soon as the signal was received that *AE2* had made the passage through the Straits. By this time *E14* had herself succeeded in entering the Marmara.

Despite the strain of being continually hunted by patrol boats Stoker maintained his aggressiveness. In the early morning of 29 April he proceeded on the surface towards Gallipoli Harbour while fully charging his battery. At dawn, just beyond the range of the forts, *AE2* dived and observed a gunboat patrolling the head of the Strait off Eski Parnar Point. Diving under the gunboat and proceeding down the Strait, *AE2* then returned up the Strait showing her periscope in an attempt to give the impression that yet another submarine was coming through the Narrows. As it was another beautiful and sunny day with the sea perfectly calm, the periscope was readily seen. Destroyers and torpedo-boats emerged from the harbour to assist the gunboat in the pursuit. Having led them all towards the Sea of Marmara, Stoker reversed course and dived unseen back to examine the Gallipoli anchorage. It was an audacious and effective tactic to draw the war ships away but unfortunately there was no worthy target in harbour. On proceeding up the Straits again, Stoker raised the periscope for another look and found the gunboat about to cross the line of fire of the stern tube. As *AE2*'s battery was getting low, and Stoker wished to end the pursuit, he fired at a range of 700 yards. The gunboat applied helm, and the torpedo passed one yard ahead (the distance was the information given to Stoker while he was a prisoner of war).¹³

According to Wheat, however, the day was somewhat busier. He writes that they spent some time attempting to get a shot at the gunboat, but were frustrated by the calm surface of the water.¹⁴ However, just as the submarine was leaving the harbour

area a transport arrived and Stoker unsuccessfully attacked with the starboard tube.¹⁵ Stoker then swung the submarine around and fired a torpedo from the stern tube, just as he was forced deep by the destroyer attempting to ram *AE2*. Wheat records that on his captain observing the scene some five minutes later the destroyers were still in hot pursuit and *AE2* had to make a long, deep run to evade them. The submarine then surfaced, and a battery charge with the diesels had commenced when six destroyers escorting two or three small transports came towards them from the direction of Constantinople. Wheat reports that as there was only one torpedo left the captain resolved to be as provocative as possible while holding the last torpedo in reserve. They remained on the surface, and closed range until *AE2* was only 800 yards from the destroyer; then the first shell was fired at them. It fell 100 yards off the starboard bow, followed by another over their heads. *AE2* was then forced to dive to avoid the shelling and a destroyer set out to ram them. According to Wheat they remained submerged for about twenty minutes and then, on coming to a depth of 20 feet, found it clear and surfaced. *AE2* then steamed towards Marmara Island. Just ten minutes later they sighted *E14* which also had recently surfaced.

6.4 Rendezvous with E14

Stoker's account after firing from the stern tube at the gunboat was that all pursuit ceased. This allowed him to surface and proceed towards the planned rendezvous with *E14*, which was 5 miles north of Kara Burnu Point. Just before reaching the position, Stoker records that *E14* surfaced close to the port bow.¹⁶

The appearance of the *E14* on the evening of 29 April 1915 boosted the morale of *AE2*'s crew. They had felt isolated and alone for five days. Now they were cheered by the sight and sound of friendly company. Boyle was senior to Stoker and with him lay the future direction of combined operations. After exchanging greetings Boyle asked Stoker about his plans for the following day. Stoker had it in mind to proceed to Constantinople. Boyle believed that they should wait in case he received further orders by wireless that evening. He directed Stoker to rendezvous with *E14* at the same location at 10.00 a.m. the next day. As nightfall was approaching, the two submarines parted. *AE2* proceeded to a bay north of Marmara Island and bottomed for the night.¹⁷




E14 at Mudros in 1915. Postcard and caption kindly supplied from the Darren Brown collection

A postcard of the submarine *E14* shown in Mudros in 1915. When the photo is enlarged it clearly shows the faces of the three officers on the conning tower, from left, Act. Lt. Reginald Wilfred Lawrence RN Third Officer, Lt. Cmdr. Edward Courtney Boyle RN CO, Lt. Edward Geldard Stanley RN First Officer. Lt. Stanley had the unique claim of having served during WWI in the Dardanelles with *E14*, the *Baltic* in command of *C35*, and in the North Sea commanding *G14*, *G7* and *J5*, making him the only submarine officer to have served in all three major campaigns. This photo was taken possibly in May 1915. *E14* has no deck gun. *E14* was ordered under the 1912-1913 programme and commissioned at Barrow-in-Furness 1 December 1914, (BR 3043 App 1). *E14* and *E15* were unusual as the positioning of their forward hydroplanes differed from the others in their class. *E14* was lost in the Dardanelles on 28 January 1918 after she had been ordered to attack the Turkish battlecruiser *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, (*ex German Goeben*), which was damaged by mines and was reported beached. *E14* found her gone and attacked a merchant ship, but due to a premature explosion of her torpedo was forced to surface where she came under Turkish gunfire. The bravery of her commander, Lt. Cmdr. Geoffrey Saxton White, who was killed saving his crew, gave *E14* her second VC.

6.5 Battle with Turkish Gunboat Sultanhisar

At daylight on 30 April 1915 *AE2* was on the surface refitting an exhaust-tank valve. She then proceeded towards the rendezvous with *E14*. On arrival at 10.00 a.m. at the appointed position a torpedo-boat was observed approaching from the west and *AE2* dived. While submerged, Stoker sighted smoke in Artaki Bay and steered south to investigate.¹⁸ There was no sign of *E14*, which came as no surprise given the activity on the surface. The log of *E14* does show that while surfaced at 9.50 a.m. she had sighted

AE2 astern so Boyle had in fact made the rendezvous as planned and by 10.45 a.m. *E14* was forced to dive when she too sighted the Turkish gunboat. From that point *E14* was unaware of *AE2*'s fate and could not help her.¹⁹ Thirty minutes later while at a depth of 50 feet, for no accountable reason, *AE2*'s bow took an upward inclination and the whole submarine started rising. Stoker quickly ordered full speed and the hydroplanes put to full dive. Despite this being done and rushing ballast forward, *AE2* continued out of control. The submarine partly surfaced barely 100 yards from the torpedo-boat and from the periscope Stoker could see she was firing at *AE2*. Stoker ordered a forward tank to be flooded. Slowly the inclination altered and the bows slipped under the surface. He then stopped flooding the forward tank, stopped pumping trim water from aft to forward, and attempted to catch her at 50 feet and level off. But the boat was now completely out of control and plunging at an ever increasing inclination, bows down, into the depths. Water was pumped out as quickly as possible but the downward plunge continued. When the 100-foot limit of her gauges was reached, the submarine was still sinking rapidly. Stoker took emergency action and ordered full astern on both main motors and blowing of main ballast. These efforts were finally successful in reversing the downwards plunge. Then, at last, the needle moved off the 100-foot mark. 'She's coming up, Sir!' reported the coxswain.²⁰



Turkish torpedo boat *Sultanhisar* 1907-1935

The Turkish torpedo boat *Sultanhisar* attacked *AE2* on the 30 April 1915, holing her pressure hull and forcing her to scuttle. *Sultanhisar* had also been in battle with *AE2* on 26 April. Her captain, Ali Riza, is shown here in top left inset.

Saved from crushing under the great pressure at the depth to which she had dived, the submarine was now confronted by the attacks of the enemy. The expulsion of water from the main ballast, combined with the screws going full astern, had given significant upward momentum. Despite all they could do, *AE2* continued to rise stern first towards the surface. As the depth gauge needle unwound, their new danger increased. The submarine broke surface stern first and its momentum carried it well out of the water. Immediately on her appearance, the torpedo boat again opened fire and within a few seconds *AE2* was hit and holed in several places in the engine room.²¹ The situation was now hopeless. *AE2* had no gun and the remaining torpedo could not be fired. With the bow angle down, the periscope could not even be trained to see their attackers while an attempt to ram, even conning from the bridge, could not hope to succeed. With the pressure hull holed in the engine room they could not dive, and water was already pouring into the compartment. There was no hope of escape and the only proper course facing Stoker was to scuttle the boat and save the lives of his men. While *AE2* was on the surface, the torpedo-boat also fired two torpedoes at her. Neither was successful.²² Had either one struck home the end would have been immediate with a likely loss of all crew.

The Turkish account of the action accords substantially with that given by Stoker, except that the Turkish officers believed that it was a hit by one of their torpedoes, which effectively disabled the *AE2*. The Turkish sources also confirm the attack carried out by Stoker several days before, on 26 April:

Efforts to detect and attack the Australian submarine *AE2* and its loss on 30 April 1915.

The Turkish transport ship No. 38 which was transporting Turkish soldiers, under the protection of the torpedo boat, *Sultanhisar*, from Istanbul to the Dardanelles was attacked by the Australian submarine *AE2* on 26 April. The captain of the Turkish ship became aware of the presence of the submarine as soon as it raised its periscope. The submarine fired a torpedo but it did not hit the ship. The *Sultanhisar* then opened fire and the submarine dived and did not repeat its attack.

The *Sultanhisar* torpedo boat searched for the submarine between Maydos and Dardanel but handed over this duty to another ship and returned to Istanbul on 30 April. The *Sultanhisar* did not steam direct to Istanbul as she was instructed to search for the submarine. When the ship came close to the Marmara Island

near Karaburun the crew saw the submarine *AE2*. The torpedo boat changed direction at once and began to attack the submarine, and opened fire with her small cannon at 08.20 a.m. The submarine raised its periscope at 08.40 a.m. from a distance of 2000 meters. The torpedo boat then opened fire again, but this time the submarine fired a torpedo. The Turkish ship successfully evaded this. Then the tower of the submarine reappeared on the sea at 09.45 a.m. It dived and appeared several times again but could no longer stay underwater because of the torpedo hit it received from the *Sultanhisar*, and finally gave up fighting. Three officers and 29 sailors surrendered and the submarine *AE2* was scuttled.²³

6.6 Scuttling and Sinking of *AE2*

Having made his decision to abandon *AE2* Stoker blew main ballast to surface quickly and ordered all hands on deck. With the main ballast blown the engine room damage was above water, and a quick and thorough scuttling was required to prevent the Turks from capturing her intact. While the crew came to the control room through the scattered and broken gear and clambered up through the conning tower onto the casing, Stoker and his First Lieutenant, Lt. Haggard, opened the ballast tank valves to flood. The Third Officer, Lieutenant Carey, on the bridge gave warning to the two below of the rising water level up the submarine's side. Stoker sent Haggard up and then had one final look around. Food, clothing, flotsam and jetsam were everywhere. He noticed his dispatch case in the wardroom and, remembering it contained some money, snatched it up just as an anxious shout came from the bridge: 'Hurry, sir, she's going down!'.²⁴ He clambered up the conning tower to find the water only 2 feet from the conning-tower hatch.

On the casing the coxswain, Petty Officer Bray, had taken charge of the evacuation, and most of the crew had already taken to the water. Once they had surfaced and shown an intention to surrender the torpedo-boat stopped firing and steamed in circles around the submarine blowing her siren to stop the fire of the gunboat further off. The torpedo-boat, *Sultanhisar*, approached the boat and threw lifebelts to the survivors. A small dinghy was lowered.²⁵ The coxswain told those who could swim to jump in and swim over to the torpedo-boat and those who could not to wait for the dinghy. The submarine sank sufficiently slowly for an orderly evacuation and as Stoker appeared on deck there were only half-a-dozen crew left, clustered on the stern as she was sinking with a bow down angle. At approximately 10.45 a.m. on 30 April 1915, *AE2* slipped under the surface.²⁶ She was recorded as sinking in a position

approximately 4 miles north of Kara Burnu Point, in the Sea of Marmara, in a depth of about 55 fathoms. On the 75th anniversary of the Anzac landing on Gallipoli, in April 1990, a memorial service was held on HMAS *Sydney* off Kara Burnu Point to mark the occasion of the loss of *AE2*. (The names of the commanding officer and crew at the time of *AE2*'s loss are set out in Appendix IVB).²⁷

Explanations as to the reason for the initial loss of trim of the submarine leading to her breaking surface are varied. From Lieutenant Commander Stoker's official report it seems that the only reason for the bow suddenly rising would be its entry into a markedly denser layer of water. Such layers of denser water were a common phenomenon in the Sea of Marmara where the fresh and salt water were not fully mixed. Significant temperature variations also existed at different depths with variations having an effect on the density of the water. Denser water would have made the bows light and would have led to *AE2* commencing to rise. The upwards movement to the surface would then result in an upwards inclination with the screws driving her up; such a movement would be reinforced by the entry of the rest of the submarine into the dense water giving her positive buoyancy overall, with its consequent overall tendency to rise. Once the mass of the submarine gained momentum, up or down, it would have been difficult to stop.

As an alternative explanation Wheat records:

We immediately dived (when the torpedo boat sighted and turned towards them) but it was soon seen that something was wrong with the boat, she appeared to be heavy by the bows and when the Captain looked around the boat a main ballast tank was found to be full of water. The valves on this tank had not been touched, how it became to be full is a mystery. The only thing we could put this incident down to was that the water had leaked into this tank during the time we were lying on the bottom, for we had a hurried refit in Malta.²⁸

The point that makes Wheat's account doubtful is that the main ballast tanks should have already been full of water. It is possible that either through a slip in his recollection, or a change in terminology over the years, Wheat was referring to some other tank. If so he could well have been referring to the forward trim tank, as this tank would normally be only about half full. If it had inadvertently filled while on the bottom because of some failure, the bows would certainly have been heavy. Consequently, this would have been discovered only after diving while catching the trim. On the other hand, of course, Stoker reports that the loss of trim was first manifest by the bows being light, not heavy.

A possible explanation of Wheat's account is that the submarine did indeed enter a denser patch of water, which brought the bows, and then the whole submarine, towards the surface. During this period the forward trim tank was deliberately flooded as one of the emergency measures to keep the bows down. It was after this deliberate flooding, and while the submarine was on its downward plunge, that the situation was impressed on Wheat and he recorded the phenomenon of the flooded tank.

Given similar circumstances in peacetime, a submarine captain could blow main ballast to get the boat safely to the surface and then slowly and carefully attend to the trim until he regained control. If *AE2* had met this trim situation at any time other than when under enemy fire, she would have survived it. Apparently *E11* in 1914, under Lieutenant Commander M. Dunbar-Nasmith, had suddenly risen by the bows in the presence of enemy destroyers and all tanks were flooded to get her down. But *E11* was in shallow water and was able to sink to the bottom and remain there until the danger had passed.²⁹

6.7 Turkish Account of the Battle *AE2* and *Sultanhisar*

The Turkish gunboat *Sultanhisar* was about 93 tons, coal fired and on duty in the Marmara in the area of the *AE2* in April 1915. Her captain, Ali Riza, later wrote an account of these events (in Turkish) which was published in 1947 in Turkey. His version of events was translated into English by Vecihi Basarin in the book written with his wife, Hatice, entitled *Beneath the Dardanelles: The Australian Submarine at Gallipoli* published in 2008.³⁰

Captain Ali Riza describes the gunfire his ship directed towards *AE2*, numerous rises and dives of the submarine, torpedoes he fired or tried to fire and torpedoes that *AE2* fired at his vessel which he avoided by his skilful manoeuvrings in a somewhat florid account of events. After rescuing the crew he treated them humanely, fought off attempts by others to take charge of his prisoners and then steamed to Istanbul where a triumphant entry occurred.³¹ Captain Riza makes it clear that he had to resist the German officers who sought to denigrate his courageous efforts but the forces against him, however, did not prevail and he was subsequently presented to the Sultan and promoted in rank.

Captain Riza had a most successful career, He was awarded the Ottoman Golden (War Service) Medal by the Sultan and the German Iron Cross by the Kaiser. He also

commanded several Turkish cruisers in WWI for the Ottoman Empire and, after the War of Independence, he received a medal for bravery and sacrifice from the government of the new Republic of Turkey.³² In 1924 he was deputy commander of the Dreadnought *Yavus* (formerly the German *Goeben* gifted to the Ottomans at the start of WWI), and then in 1925, commander of the cruiser *Mecidiye* and later Commander in Chief of the Fleet. He retired in 1928 and died in 1949 aged 69 years.


In summary, while the account by Captain Riza is emotional and inaccurate in some details it is accurate on the important facts in that he was the captain of the *Sultanhisar* on 30 April 1915 when its gunfire holed *AE2* and forced her to scuttle and Riza and his crew promptly and humanely rescued the *AE2* crew from drowning and treated them well. The two principle inaccuracies may be summarized from those identified by Rear Admiral Peter Briggs AO CSC RAN Ret'd in the foreword to the Basarins' book as:

- *AE2* did not fire any torpedoes at *Sultanhisar*; and
- *AE2* did not attempt to ram it.

Furthermore *AE2* did not surface, dive and resurface anything like the number of times stated by Captain Riza.

Captain Riza's account is also valuable in that the details have added much and its translation and publication by Vecihi and Hattice Basarin has been a major contribution to a fuller understanding of these events.

The map and summary of events under set out some further details of the passage of *AE2* through the Dardanelles and in the Marmara from 24 to 30 April 1915.



AE2 generally running amok' April 1915. Map compiled using Stoker's report and E14 log

Sunday 25 April 1915.

1. Sometime after midnight *AE2* weighed from anchorage off Tenedos.
2. At 2.30 a.m. *AE2* entered the straits at about 8 knots.
3. At about 4.30 a.m., being then not quite abreast of Swandere River, *AE2* sighted and fired upon and began to dive through the minefields to a depth of 70 to 80 feet, during the ensuing half-hour or so scraping of wires against the vessel's sides.
4. Sometime after 6.a.m. *AE2* attacked the Turkish Gunboat *Peike Shetrek* and scored a hit. **1st Torpedo used.**
5. Turkish battleship in the Narrows had been firing across the peninsula at the ships anchored off the landing beaches. That fire compelled the allied transports to move further out to a safer position. On possibly sighting *AE2*'s periscope she moved to the north.
6. After altering course to avoid *Peike Shetrek* *AE2* ran aground bow first under Fort Anatoli Medjidieh and was under fire for 4 minutes before successfully refloating.
7. *AE2* then ran aground under the fort also called Fort Diermon Burnu on the European side of the Narrows.
8. *AE2* surrounded by Turkish vessels which attempt to ram her approaching Nagara Point. *AE2* dived to 70 feet.
9. At 8.30 a.m. *AE2* went to the Asiatic shore to await developments, as battery power then remaining was not sufficient to get far out into Sea of Marmara and thereby gain a fair chance of shaking pursuit., *AE2* settled at 80 feet to rest.
10. At about 9.00 a.m. Turkish vessel overhead, dragging hooks heard to hit her hull.
11. 9.00 p.m. *AE2* surfaced and signalled her success to the Fleet, and commenced to charge batteries.

Monday 26 April 1915.

12. About 4.00 a.m. *AE2* proceeded on the surface up the Straits.
13. Just before dawn *AE2* sighted 2 Turkish warships and fires a torpedo which missed. **2nd Torpedo used.**
14. *AE2* investigates Gallipoli harbour.
15. *AE2* entered the Sea of Marmara and about 9.30 a.m. Stoker sighted four ships ahead and attacked one vessel with a torpedo which failed to hit. **3rd Torpedo used.**
16. After dark *AE2* made her way close to the Gallipoli shore and attempted to use her wireless but no reply received.

Tuesday 27 April 1915.

17. At dawn *AE2* sighted ship approaching from eastward, escorted by two destroyers, bow tube fired but torpedo again failed. **4th Torpedo used.**
18. *AE2* spent the rest of the day on the surface, steaming around close to Marmara Island,
19. *AE2* rested on the bottom of Artaki Bay.

Wednesday 28 April 1915.

20. *AE2* in the morning attacks small ship convoyed by two destroyers. Fires starboard beam torpedo at 300 yards range but torpedo again fails. **5th Torpedo used.**
21. At dusk *AE2* sighted two men o'war, port tube fired which missed, **6th Torpedo used.**
22. After nightfall *AE2* proceeded towards Gallipoli to reach nearest point to get wireless connection.

Thursday 29 April 1915.

23. In the early morning *AE2* proceeded on the surface towards Gallipoli Harbour, reversed course, and then again turned back to the harbour. Stoker fired another torpedo at a Turkish gunboat but missed. **7th Torpedo used.*NOTE*** Diary of Wheat claims Stoker fired two torpedoes, one from the starboard tube followed by one from the stern tube. He then claimed *AE2* had one left but if two were fired she would have no torpedoes left.
24. At 3.00 p.m. HMS *Adamant* log recorded 1 PO, 1 SPO, 1 Ldg Sea, 1 Ldg Sto, 1 Stoker and 1 Writer III all R.A.N. joined ship as spare crew for *AE2* from *Hindu Kush*. *Adamant* had moved from Cape Kephala Imbros Island to Tenedos Island 28 April and moved back to Imbros 10 May.
25. Submarine *E14* sights *AE2* at 5.20 p.m. and closes her. Boyle and Stoker meet to discuss tactics. Boyle as the senior orders Stoker to meet him in the morning at the same location.
26. *AE2* headed to a location just north of Marmara Island and rested on the bottom for the night.

Friday 30 April 1915.

27. *AE2* surfaced at dawn, charged batteries and headed off to her meeting with *E14*.
28. At 10.00 a.m. *AE2* dived after sighting Turkish Gunboat. *AE2* holed by Turkish gunboat and scuttled, at approximately 10.45 a.m.

6.8 Allied Submarine Successes and Losses after AE2

E14 and the other submarines of the British and French squadrons had mixed fortunes while *AE2* was leading her hectic life and after her loss on 30 April. It has been recounted how that important signal from Stoker informed the fleet that the passage by submarines was possible. In the light of this information, *E14* had set out on 27 April and got through, and then on 29 April the French submarine *Bernoulli* got as far as Nagara, but her batteries had become so depleted by then that she was unable to prevent being swept downstream again in the swift current.³³ The sister vessel, the French submarine *Joule*, next tried the passage but was unfortunate enough to strike a mine and was lost with all hands.

On 29 April, the day of the rendezvous with *AE2*, *E14* had attacked and sunk a transport under the escort of destroyers. On 5 May, she torpedoed a gunboat of the Aintab class (about 200 tons), the ship breaking in half and sinking within a minute. On the same day *E14* torpedoed a transport although the warhead failed to explode, and another transport was forced to turn back into Constantinople. On 10 May, she sank the big transport ship *Gul Djemal* (5000 tons; formerly the British White Star liner *Germanic*), loaded with artillery and 6000 troops. It took the last serviceable torpedo but the transport sank almost immediately.³⁴ On 15 May *E14* managed to frighten a small steamer so that she ran aground. Boyle continued to cruise the Marmara area until his recall was ordered on 17 May. When he returned home through the Straits he was able to pass on valuable information to Nasmith before he attempted another penetration of the Straits in *E11*. The story of the hair-raising exploits of Nasmith in the *E11*, including his entry into the harbour of Constantinople and sinking the *Stambul* in the very heart of Turk defences, is fully recorded elsewhere.³⁵ On this first patrol the *E11* sank a gunboat, two ammunition ships, two troopships, two storeships and caused the beaching of a third transport.

Quite a few other submarines attempted to enter the Sea of Marmara. Those successful included *E12* (Lieutenant Commander Bruce), *E7* (Lieutenant Commander A.D. Cochrane) and *E2* (Lieutenant Commander D. de B. Stocks). The French submarine *Mariotte* became entangled in nets and was scuttled on 25 July.³⁶ On 4 September, on setting out through the Narrows for her second patrol, the *E7* also became entangled in the nets and was sunk by a mine lowered onto her from a boat.³⁷ Serving in *E7* and captured on her loss were two Australian submariners, Leading Stoker John Kerin ON 7391, from New South Wales,³⁸ and Able Seaman E. A. Gwynne ON 7475, both of whom were spare crew for *AE2*. As they were not required for the Australian boat they had been sent from the depot ship to *E7*.

On 7 November the French submarine *Turquoise* was captured in the Marmara intact and, from a captured book in the captain's cabin, the position and time of a rendezvous with *E20* was revealed to the Turks. This led to the *E20* being sunk at the rendezvous by the German *U-14*.³⁹ The *E14* and *E11* were the most successful of the allied submarines and they amassed a large score. Both Boyle and Nasmith received Victoria Crosses for their achievements in the Marmara, and their crews were variously decorated, including the First Lieutenant of *E11*, Lieutenant G. D'Oyly-Hughes. *E14* was finally lost in January 1918 with an Australian, Able Seaman Mitchell of Ballarat, rendering heroic service.⁴⁰ (Four of the five Victoria Crosses awarded to British

submariners in World War I were awarded in the Dardanelles submarine theatre of operations. They were awarded to Lieutenant N.D. Holbrook of *B11*, Commander E.C. Boyle of *E14*, Lieutenant Commander M. Nasmith of *E11* and Lieutenant Commander G.S. White of *E14*.)⁴¹



***E2* in Mudros 1915.** Original postcard and caption kindly supplied from the Darren Brown collection

E2 under the command of Lt. Cmdr. D. de B. Stocks first arrived at Mudros 5 August 1915 and joined the list of E Class submarines that penetrated the Dardanelles. *E2* survived the war. This photo shows *E2* with a new deck gun fitted forward of her conning tower. She is often misidentified as *AE2* in photos.



***E7* at Spithead review 1914.** Original postcard and caption kindly supplied from the Darren Brown collection

E7 under the command of Lt. Cmdr. A.D. Cochrane first arrived at Mudros with *E12* on 14 June 1915. She penetrated the Dardanelles and conducted a very successful three week patrol in June-July, only to be lost on her second attempt on 4 September 1915 in the nets off Nagara. Two *AE2* spare crew RAN ratings were serving with her at the time, both becoming POWs.



E12 at Mudros 1915. Original Postcard and caption kindly supplied from the Darren Brown collection

E12 under the command of Lt. Cmdr. Kenneth Mervyn Bruce first arrived at Mudros with *E7* on 14 June 1915. *E12* penetrated the Dardanelles and was very successful. On one patrol they lasted an incredible 40 days in October-November 1915 and on return caught in the net at Nagara, and were dragged down to 245 feet but survived and returned. On Bruce's papers is a comment about losing his nerve after a trying experience in the Dardanelles.




E20 at Mudros 1915. Original postcard and caption kindly supplied from the Darren Brown collection

E20 under the command of Lt. Cmdr. C H Warren first arrived at Mudros 24 September 1915. *E20* had the unique 6 inch howitzer fitted which would have been a valuable asset in the Sea of Marmara. *E20* first penetrated the Dardanelles on 23 October 1915 but was sunk on 6 November 1915 in the Sea of Marmara by the German *U-14*.

6.9 Impact of AE2 on the War

It would be appropriate here to survey the situation into which the allied submarines thrust themselves and the effect they had upon the Turkish wartime operations. Turkey had a paucity of railway communications at the outbreak of war and a shortage of locomotives and rolling stock. This meant that the main lines of communication from Constantinople to Gallipoli and from south of Marmara to Gallipoli were by sea. The only alternative was the overland link to the Gallipoli Peninsula by rail to Uzun Keupri on the Adrianople line, and thence by road via Keshan and the Isthmus of Bulair. The distance from Uzun Keupri to the Narrows by road was about 100 miles.⁴²



***E11's* triumphant return from her first Dardanelles patrol May-June 1915.** Glass slide image and caption kindly supplied from the Darren Brown collection.

An image taken from an original magic lantern glass slide showing submarine *E11* being cheered by sailors on HMS *Grampus* returning from the Dardanelles on 6 June 1915. Of particular interest is that the Royal Navy still had in use the Pennant Numbering system on their submarines, with *E11's* 91 clearly visible on her conning tower. *E11* was ordered under the 1912-1913 Programme, and completed on 15 September 1914 at Barrow-in-Furness, (BR 3043 App 1). *E11* was removed from the active list on 1 April 1919 and sold to B. Zammit at Malta for scrap on 7 April 1921. In October 1914 Lieutenant Commander Dunbar-Nasmith had failed to follow *E1* and *E9* into the Baltic in *E11* due to mechanical problems, and later the German patrols became too strong for Nasmith. This was fortunate for had he succeeded in forcing the Baltic, he simply would not have won the VC. The Baltic was also an exceedingly difficult passage and Cmdr. Max Horton, *E9*, Cmdr. Francis Goodhart, *E8* and Cmdr. Francis Cromie, *E19*, achieved results on par with the Dardanelles colleagues and to some extent even more by the large German warships German iron ore vessels they sank, and yet not one of them gained a VC for their exploits. After the last two boats *E18* and *E19* forced the Baltic in September 1915 it was deemed too dangerous and not attempted again. By contrast the penetration of the Narrows was never stopped for this reason.

With the appearance of *AE2* in the Sea of Marmara Turkey's vital sea transport lane to the Gallipoli Peninsula was threatened just at that crucial moment after the allied landings. As the Official History notes:

Her activity (*AE2*), and that of the *E11* who followed her on the 18 May, was of immense value to the Expeditionary Force, and towards the end of the month the Turkish sea-communications had been completely disrupted. After that date, thanks to the continued activity of the submarine service, no more reinforcements were sent from Constantinople by sea, and though the enemy continued to despatch food and stores in small vessels which hugged the coast and moved only at night, all Turkish writers agree that the maintenance of their army on the peninsular remained throughout the campaign an acutely anxious problem.⁴³

The disruption by the submarines did not stop there. They carried the war into Turkish harbours, a prominent example being the feat by Lieutenant Commander Dunbar-Nasmith in *E11* sinking the *Stambul* in Constantinople Harbour itself, the first such success against the Ottomans for 500 years, which threw the city into confusion for some time. As they developed their techniques, and after being fitted with guns, the submarines also shelled the road and railway where they lay close to the coast. By taking prearranged ranging shots they could wait, dive and be unseen until a train, marching soldiers or other military targets reached a certain part of a road or railway then surface and shell them, often to great effect. In an attempt to cut the Constantinople-Adrianople railway line carrying munitions and troops to the front, the first lieutenant of *E2*, Lieutenant L. V. Lyon, swam ashore with a demolition charge. Although a loud explosion was heard, nothing more was ever seen of Lyon.⁴⁴

If *AE2* had not successfully penetrated the Marmara, possibly the others would not have done so either. The greatest achievement by Stoker and the crew of *AE2* was that they showed the feat was possible. Until 25 April, two submarines had fallen victim to the traps and hazards of the Narrows. By careful planning and outstanding courage and ship handling, Stoker pioneered the route, so that those who followed had the comfort and encouragement of knowing before they set out that it was possible to do so.

As mentioned above, the effect of the submarine operations was devastating to Turkey's war effort and slowed the seaborne traffic across the Marmara to a trickle.⁴⁵ Exclusive of the damage done by *E20* and the French *Turquoise*, the known Turkish losses to submarines in the campaign were:

Battleships	1	Transports	11
Destroyers	1	Steamers	44
Gunboats	5	Sailing vessels	148 ⁴⁶

As one German writer put it, when commenting on the work of the submarines in the Marmara:

The depredations of these unwelcome visitors became more and more alarming. Things came to such a pass that communication by water between Rodosto on the European and Panderma on the Asiatic side became impossible.⁴⁷

And the German General Liman von Sanders, commanding the overall army in the Dardanelles campaign, wrote: 'Had the British managed to increase their undersea offensive the Fifth Army would have starved'.⁴⁸



Chief ERA Allen RAN with *E11* and his DSM 1915 (above) and with *E11* periscope (see next page for commentary). Photos courtesy of the RNSM, caption kindly supplied by Darren Brown



The photo on previous page shows the crew of *E11* gathered around the deck gun, Cmdr. Martin Eric Nasmith VC (later Dunbar-Nasmith) can be seen in the back row. In the front row the ERA closest to the camera is Chief ERA Leonard Charles Allen, 269714, RAN 9286. Allen was spare crew for *AE2* and was not with her when she was lost. He became available to serve with the British boats and served in *E11*. While serving with her he was awarded the DSM after Nasmith's citation for his quick work in repairing the deck gun within 24 hours which had misfired and blown the gun layer overboard on 6 August 1915. The photo on the left shows Allen with the shot away periscope damaged during the engagement on 23 May 1915 with the Turkish gunboat *Penlengi-Deria* in which *E11* came out the victor by sinking the enemy vessel. Allen was obviously the go to man as the Chief ERA for repairs and holds a pride of place in the Royal Navy Submarine Museum.

6.10 Informing the Next of Kin of *AE2* Loss

Turning back to the events concerning *AE2*, the news of her loss was slow to come through. The Turkish radio broadcasts of it were ignored at first as it was thought to be propaganda. The first inkling officially was through Dutch sources to the Australian Naval Representative in London, who reported the news to Navy Office in Melbourne on 15 May 1915. Official statements from Turkey were then given more weight and her loss became accepted. The names of those aboard were held in the submarine depot ship, HMS *Adamant*, which immediately notified the Admiralty of those on board *AE2* on sailing. On 25 May 1915, the American Ambassador in Constantinople confirmed the loss when he reported that the three officers and twenty-nine men of the *AE2* had been captured.⁴⁹

The task of informing the next of kin was shared between Admiralty in London and Navy Office in Melbourne. The following men had their next of kin in Australia: Gilbert, Bray, Nichols, Wheat, Middleton, Kinder, Kerin, Suckling, Hamilton, Williams, Vaughan and Cullen.⁵⁰ The rest of the crew had their next of kin in Britain.

The only bright spot in the loss of Australia's second submarine was that no lives were lost. Once aboard the torpedo-boat, the submariners were allowed to dry their clothes and were then bundled into the forecastle, while the vessel proceeded to

Gallipoli and berthed alongside a hospital ship. There they were fallen in and inspected by the German Commander, General Liman von Sanders, and his staff⁵¹ before being transferred to Constantinople.

6.11 Capture and Initial Treatment of AE2 Crew

When the submariners arrived at the Turkish capital they were ordered into Turkish soldiers' outfits, including greatcoat and fez, and in the early morning of 1 May marched from the Constantinople wharf to the military barracks. Apart from a crowd at the wharf no particular notice was taken and no hostility shown by the populace on their march, although their capture had already been broadcast on the radio. According to Stoker some of the children were a little disconcerting, however, in drawing their fingers across their throats with unmistakable significance.⁵² At the barracks the officers were separated from the sailors and were thereafter kept apart. Stoker and the officers were initially treated well. They were given reasonable food and allowed to bathe while the Turkish commandant and other officers attempted to learn details of *AE2*'s passage, armament and operations. When they obtained no satisfaction, the treatment changed and they were placed in a small unsanitary room. Meanwhile the crew had been given similar treatment and, in a somewhat desultory way, interrogated. None of them were violently treated. Enver Pasha himself came to interrogate Stoker, who later recorded that he subsequently left in an ill temper at failing to gain any intelligence. Stoker was then placed in solitary confinement.

By this time the crew were beginning to understand the basic problems which were to confront them for the next three and a half years—lack of food, clothing and bedding, abundant vermin and the peasant ignorance exhibited by many of their guards. Much of the hardship that they were forced to endure was because of the different standard of living and diet of the Turks. The treatment meted to them accorded with the harsh treatment meted by the Turks to their own soldiers. The corruption and brutality of some Turk and German captors in certain camps came from the personalities of the persons involved and was not attributable to a general policy to that end.

The Brenchleys in *Stoker's Submarine*, summarised the situation well when they wrote:

The Turkish attitude to the crew was complicated. Very few Turks had any knowledge of Australia, and they must have been extremely angered by the *AE2*'s exposure of their Gallipoli supply lines to submarine attack. Individual responses to the submariners tended to be good at first but deteriorated later.

...

The Turks, applying to some degree the international rules of prisoners of war at that time, required all enlisted men, but not officers, to work and they paid them a small wage. This money was supplemented by various international payments that sometimes reached the men, and money cobbled together by Stoker and his officers. But the *AE2* men were angered at the exorbitant prices they were often charged for necessities.⁵³

6.12 Interrogation of *AE2* Officers

As mentioned above, after their capture the *AE2* crew were interrogated. Captain Arundel RAN Ret'd found the transcript of the interrogations of *AE2*'s officers in the German archives and the English translation and further details are set out in Appendix VI.

6.13 Arrival as POWs at Afion Kara Hissar


On 8 May 1915 both officers and men were moved from Constantinople across the Bosphorus to Scutari, and east by train to Afion Kara Hissar. There they were herded into huts for two days and suffered considerable hardship from the cold. Their complaints may have been heeded because they were finally moved to other accommodation, where they met some French submariners from the *Sapphire* and some of the crew from the *E15*. On 15 May they were joined by two Australian soldiers captured in the fighting on the peninsula.⁵⁴ Afion Kara Hissar was the general holding post for all prisoners of war (POWs) in Turkey at that time. One of the Turkish officers who was particularly harsh was a Lieutenant Commander, saved from the Turkish battleship *Messedieh*, which had been torpedoed and sunk by the *B11* on 13 December 1914. (As is mentioned in Chapter 5 and again in Chapter 23, the *B11* was commanded by Lieutenant Holbrook, who was awarded a VC for the action).⁵⁵

On 1 June 1915 the *AE2* crew, along with other POWs, were sent out to work on the roads. They were paid some pittance for this and, even though it was small, they were in dire need of it as their rations were inadequate and the only money coming in was a small amount Stoker managed to send to them. In July they were sent away from the barracks to work on roads further out in the country.⁵⁶ On return to Afion Kara Hissar they were joined by some new allied prisoners, whose train had been

shelled by *E11* on the journey. It was welcome news to the submariners to know that their fellow submariners were vigorously prosecuting the war. The conditions in the barracks improved at about that time as well. The reason soon became evident: on 8 August Mr Henry Morgenthau, the American Ambassador in Constantinople, arrived at the town to see the prisoners and inspect the barracks. It was probably the result of his interest and his efforts that conditions for the POWs were not far worse. The American and the Dutch Ambassadors, and the Red Cross, were of particular value in alleviating the hardships to the POWs.⁵⁷ Although letters from home were irregular and the food and clothing parcels seldom got through, it was probably because of their efforts that anything arrived at all. The obstacles were those officially placed by Turkish authorities, such as censorship, and those due to the inherent inefficiency of the Turkish system, together with the corruption and dishonesty of certain Turkish officers. At least one POW saw on sale in the local town an object that he knew could only have been sent from Australia for him.⁵⁸ However, thanks once again to diplomatic intervention, the money allowances became fairly regular after some initial delay. This money was essential to buy enough food to live, even at the inflated rates at which certain camp commandants made the food available, thereby making illegal profits.

6.14 Stoker Imprisoned as Turkish Reprisal

From time to time the officers were able to send money and messages to the crew and on 14 September 1915, the anniversary of the loss of *AE1*, Stoker was able to speak with them.⁵⁹ On 2 October Stoker and Lieutenant Fitzgerald, an officer from *E15*, were sent to Constantinople for special imprisonment as a reprisal by Enver Pasha for alleged maltreatment of the Turkish POWs in Egypt. After 32 days imprisonment, of which 25 were in solitary confinement in a dark, wet dungeon, their lives were undoubtedly saved by proof that there was no such maltreatment of Turks and by the active intervention once again of the American Ambassador, Henry Morgenthau,⁶⁰ who had sought an interview with Enver Pasha. On release the two emaciated men were given five days in a luxury hotel in Constantinople, before being returned to the POW camp at Afion Kara Hissar. Thanks to intervention by Ambassador Morgenthau and the Papal Apostolic Delegate, Lieutenant Fitzgerald was repatriated on a parole to England in January 1916 as an apology for the reprisal. Stoker was not. The different treatment possibly arose because Fitzgerald was of the Roman Catholic faith and Vatican pressure was successfully brought to bear in his favour.



AE2 Officers in POW Camp Turkey. Postcard and caption kindly supplied from the Darren Brown collection

This original handmade postcard was part of the personal collection of Oscar Parkes who in 1919 became official naval artist and director of the naval photographic section at the Imperial War Museum, UK. Before he left the Service in 1920 he had already been appointed editor of *Jane's Fighting Ship*. Each card was unique and marked with his distinct blue handwriting, but obviously he did not always get the caption right as AE2's officers were not POW's in 1914 as the writing on the right has it. From left it shows Lt. Geoffrey Haggard, Lt. Cmdr. Henry Stoker, and Lt. John Pitt Cary.

6.15 Stoker's Two Escape Attempts

Stoker and two other officers escaped from Afion Kara Hissar on 23 March 1916. They covered most of the rugged 130 miles to the Mediterranean coast where, starving and exhausted, they sought shelter from a shepherd. This they got but the shepherd's report of the incident led to their recapture. Imprisonment followed for months and a slow, dilatory court martial. Although they feared for their lives, the sentence was 25 days imprisonment for Stoker, and 20 each for the other two. After so long in prison the sentence was absurd as they had long since served out their term. They burst into laughter, in which the officers of the court joined,⁶¹ apparently knowing full well the effect of their decision. Pursuing his duty to attempt escape, the indefatigable Stoker organised a further attempt after receiving secret maps, section by section, in a series

of postcards from an officer who had already escaped to freedom. But this escape attempt also failed.⁶²

6.16 Harsh POW Conditions. Crew Escape Attempts

The conditions in the camps where *AE2* sailors were confined were harsher than those experienced by the officers, probably because of the requirement that the sailors should work. Life was a struggle against starvation and malnutrition, against typhus and malaria, and especially against their greatest irritant—vermin. Initially, they were mixed with other prisoners, that is, submariners from *E15*, *E7* (including the Australian Leading Stoker A. Wilson),⁶³ *E20*, *Saphir* and *Turquoise*, and army and air force personnel. Later they were split up and some went to different work camps. Despite the extremes of weather and debilitating conditions some escapes were made. The two *AE2* Able Bodied Seamen (torpedo men), Wheat and Nichols, managed an escape for 19 days from Belemedik Pouzanti but were forced by starvation and sickness to give themselves up. Wheat managed a second escape with Stoker J. Cullen (*AE2*) and Private S. Samson (AIF).⁶⁴ Again hunger, continuous rain and sickness drove them to return. This time, Wheat's life was only saved from his treatment in solitary confinement by the intervention of Captain Clifford, a medical officer of the Indian Medical Service. During their internment some pressure was brought to bear for the alleviation of hardship for the Roman Catholic sailors through the Apostolic Delegate in Constantinople. Probably because of this, a party of men from *AE2*, including Able Seamen Nichols and Churcher and Stoker Wishart, were transferred to work at St Stefano⁶⁵ where conditions, while hardly luxurious, were at least better than those working on the railway.

6.17 Four AE2 Crew Die in POW Camps

During these brutal years four of the crew of *AE2* died. Most of the work activity during 1916 was concerned with the railway, and was centred around the camp at Belemedik. Malnutrition, exhaustion and exposure brought on sickness and disease. Furthermore, once ill, the medical treatment was mainly that obtained from self-help among the prisoners, with doubtful assistance from their captors. Chief Stoker C. Varcoe died of meningitis at Belemedik on 18 September 1916. His widow was living in Devon, England.⁶⁶ During one of the plagues of typhus that swept the camp two of the crew of *AE2* were carried off, one of whom was Petty Officer S.J. Gilbert, RAN, who

had joined the RAN on 15 April 1913 for five years service after some 17 years in the RN. He died on 9 October 1916. His widow was resident in Australia and she returned to England after the war.⁶⁷ The other death from typhus was that of Able Seaman A.E. Knaggs, who died on 22 October 1916 and was buried at Belemedik. His widow was then living in Bristol, England.⁶⁸ (The last entry in his diary is dated 19 July.)



Grave of AE2 Petty Officer Stephen John Gilbert in Turkey. Photo courtesy of the AWM P01645.004 and caption by Darren Brown

Grave in the Christian cemetery of Petty Officer Stephen John Gilbert 8053 from *AE2*. He died on 9 October 1916 aged 39 years from malaria and typhus while working on the Baghdad to Berlin Railway. Later his body was reinterred in the war cemetery at Baghdad.




Grave of AE2 Chief Petty Officer Charles Varcoe in Turkey. Photo courtesy of the AWM P01645.003 and caption by Darren Brown

The grave on the left closest to camera is that of Chief Petty Officer Charles Varcoe, 8275 in the Christian cemetery Belemedick, Turkey c.1916. He died 18 September 1916 from meningitis while working on the Baghdad to Berlin railway. Later his body was reinterred in the war cemetery at Baghdad.

Stoker M.W. Williams was working at Belemedik when he was moved to the hard labour site five miles away at Bezardjite.⁶⁹ In September 1916 he was sent to Pozanti to work and was admitted to hospital with malaria, together with Private H. Ridgeway of the 1/5th Lancashire Fusiliers (captured at Achi Baba on 7 August 1915). Ridgeway recovered from his delirium and searched for Williams, but his inquiries revealed no trace of him. Wheat alleges that the Turks were murdering the delirious patients in the hospital in Angora⁷⁰ and Williams's disappearance was certainly mysterious. As inquiries by the Red Cross revealed no further information, the Department of the Navy fixed his date of death at 30 September 1915. Williams' mother had written several times⁷¹ to the Prime Minister, Hon. W.M. Hughes, concerning the tardy treatment accorded to her pension rights for this, the fourth son lost to her in the war (three were lost in action in the Army). Her letters are a tiny glimpse of the hardships she and others had to bear. In her case these were not lessened in any way by the dilatory manner in which her right to a pension was treated when the relevant department had difficulty in determining not that her son had died, but the exact date of death.⁷²

6.18 AE2 Crew Release 1918 and Subsequent Events

At the end of the war the avenue for release of the survivors of *AE2* depended largely on their location in Turkey. Some of them made their way to Constantinople, where the Dutch Ambassador commandeered hotel accommodation and they were given their first humane treatment for three and a half years. When the British fleet arrived the submariners were cared for by the submarine depot ship, HMS *Adamant* (Commander Venning), and for five days they were the guests of the submarine flotilla. Those in the party with Nichols went by steamer to Mudros, then Malta, and finally London, seeing the wreck of *E15* still stranded on Kephez Point as they passed in their steamer. Others, such as those with Wheat in Belemelik, went by train down to Smyrna, there to be met by the Australian hospital ship *Kanowna*.⁷³ The ship took them to Alexandria, and then to England. Stoker Petty Officer Kinder was able to be sent directly home to Australia.⁷⁴



POW Booklet for Turkey

This original booklet was designed to help families cope while their relatives were prisoner of war in Turkey. There are many guidelines of do's and don'ts in relation to written mail, sending food parcels, and it basically sets out the type of conditions the men were facing in captivity.

National Archives Melbourne Reference MP472/1 MP472/1/O Barcode 1035672

On return to England the submariners went their various ways for recuperation leave. Most of those who were on loan from the RN reverted to the RN although some of them later joined with those RAN sailors who were posted to service in the J

boats and returned to Australia with them; see Chapter 10. At least two ratings, Petty Officer Bray and Stoker Jenkins, returned home to Australia as part of the crew of the submarine depot ship HMAS *Platypus*. The list of *AE2* officers and ratings at time of her loss and details of their next of kin are set out in Appendix IVA.

6.19 Stoker's Subsequent Career

At the end of the war, Stoker and the other two *AE2* officers were repatriated back to England but life was different to when Stoker left for Australia in early 1914. On the domestic personal side, Stoker and his wife, Olive, were not getting on and they subsequently divorced. As mentioned in Chapter 5, they had married in 1908.

Stoker returned to service in the Navy only two months after returning to the UK. He found the Navy had, in his view, changed and some contemporaries had been promoted over him during his captivity. He was awarded a Distinguished Service Order (DSO) in 1919 for "his gallantry in making the passage of the Dardanelles"⁷⁵ and in the same year he was also awarded a Mention in Despatches for valuable service in the prosecution of the war during his subsequent service.⁷⁶ However, the captains of *B11* and two of the E boats were awarded VCs and this might have rankled. Although they had greater successes against the enemy, Stoker had shown the way was possible for seven British and one French submarine.⁷⁷ He had torpedoed a Turkish cruiser and disrupted the Turkish supply across the Marmara for five days during a critical phase of the war.

On his return to service Stoker was given command of *K9*, a class of submarine that did not achieve any distinction. Stoker was promoted to Commander on 31st December 1919. After a slight collision in *K9* he was heavily criticized by the Commander-in-Chief such that he asked to be relieved from submarine service and be posted to a capital ship. There were no positions open and, while awaiting a posting and with typical initiative, he took up acting and was performing in a play in the West End of London when his posting came through as captain of the cruiser *Royal Arthur*.⁷⁸ He turned down this appointment, retired from the Royal Navy and went on the stage full time with considerable success.⁷⁹ Among his roles was that of the Colonel in 'Journey's End' throughout a lengthy London season. The 1928 cast included the young Robert Speaight and an even younger Laurance Olivier. He also performed Captain Holt of HMS *Chrybdis* in the 1930s epic naval film 'Brown on Resolution' based on the novel by C.S. Forester with John Mills playing his first lead role.⁸⁰

In 1925 Stoker married Dorothie Marjorie Pidcock, a fellow actor in some of his plays. They were contentedly married for some 40 years.⁸¹ Stoker's artistic career went from strength to strength with character plays including one play set in a submarine in which the producer offered to show him how a periscope worked! In the 1920s he wrote his story of *AE2* in *Straws in the Wind*, which is a racy and popular account of his submarine career including the penetration of the Dardanelles.

He returned to the Navy in World War II at the age of fifty-four. He served as Chief of Staff to the Flag Officer in Command at Belfast, as Commanding Officer of HMS *Minos*, the Naval Base at Lowestoft, as a Public Relations Officer for the Navy and then with the team preparing the invasion plans for the 'D' Day landings which included some submarines guiding the landing forces to their correct beaches. See Chapter 17 for the part played by the X-craft submarines in the D Day landings.

After his World War II service Stoker returned to theatre, films, broadcasting and producing and continued his successful career.⁸² He was always very athletic and played a wide variety of sports throughout his life. One reason he volunteered for *AE2* and Australian service was that he heard that they played a lot of polo in Australia. He became one of the leading croquet players in the British Isles and won the Irish championship in 1962, aged 77 years.⁸³ Stoker died in London on 2 February 1966 on his eighty-first birthday.

Many think that Stoker should have been awarded a VC as was Holbrook and some of the other submarine captains in the Dardanelles campaign. In 2012 a submission was made by Rear Admiral Peter Briggs AO CSC RAN Ret'd, a former submariner, to the Australian Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal for Stoker to be awarded a VC but in 2013 the Tribunal disappointingly failed to recommend a VC for any of the 12 heroes recommended to it.⁸⁴ Further detail about Stoker's naval career is set out in Appendix IIIB, 'Commissioning Crew of *AE2*'.

6.20 Haggard's Subsequent Career and Australian Life

Turning now to the *AE2*'s First Lieutenant, Lieutenant Geoffrey Haggard, some detail of his naval career and life in Australia can be found in Appendix IIIB. After returning to England from the Turkish prison camp Haggard was awarded a DSC in recognition of his gallantry on the *AE2* in the Dardanelles which was bestowed on him by King George V on 17 May 1919.⁸⁵

Haggard found it difficult to enjoy civilian life. Not only had life in England changed, but also the way in which he viewed the world. In addition to enduring the hardships of prison camp, the war had taken from Haggard his brother Lance and his first cousins Mark and John. Haggard was also just one of many servicemen returning from the war who needed counselling and special consideration in order to integrate back into English society. Haggard's daughter, Jennifer Smyth, wrote that this was an unsettled time for her father who appeared gaunt and 'his spirit was restless'.⁸⁶ Perhaps he was disappointed that most of the praise for the success of *AE2* had gone to Stoker and little of it had been directed to him as First Lieutenant.⁸⁷

As one might expect from a man of such resolve, Haggard made an attempt to remain in RN submarines despite the hardships he had faced during service. Haggard's mother, who initially cared for him upon his return, suspected that her son was still 'awaiting the excitement of faraway places'. Haggard was accepted to return to service by the RN but not in submarines. The Admiralty staff suspected that war had reduced his powers of concentration but did note that he was still 'temperate, keen and zealous'.⁸⁸

Disappointed that he could not return to service in submarines, he retired at his own request on 27 November 1920 as a Lieutenant Commander. Haggard's life took an unexpected turn when George Rous, 3rd Earl of Stradbroke, invited him to be Aide-de-Camp during the Earl's forthcoming appointment as the Governor of Victoria, Australia. He took up the invitation.



AE2 Officer's Haggard and Stoker circa 1919. Courtesy Australian National Maritime Museum

In June 1921, whilst living in Victoria, Haggard met Marjorie Syme, a woman 15 years his junior and the daughter of Victorian newspaper baron David Syme, a proprietor of *The Age*. In 1923 Haggard wrote to Marjorie and asked her to marry him and when they married Haggard was 35 and Marjorie was 20. The couple lived together in the Yarra Valley, about 40 miles from Melbourne where Haggard worked their property and became a successful country squire running livestock for many years.⁸⁹

By 1939, with war imminent, Haggard applied to join the RAN but was rejected. He then applied to the Royal Navy and in August 1939 received correspondence that a position in Singapore in the RN may be available for him. On 10 October 1939, Haggard left his property 'Pendleside' and walked down to the nearby Woori Yallock town to check the mail (presumably for his letter of acceptance by the RN). No letter had arrived and he decided to have a few cool beers in the pub before taking a shortcut along the railway tracks. When he reached a road crossing, his foot became stuck in a cattle pit with the 2.00 p.m. train approaching. Although the exact circumstances of

his death are unclear, it is likely that an object hanging from the train struck Haggard in the head which caused a haemorrhage and he died on the bank of the train tracks. Haggard left a very young widow and three small children.

In 1952, Haggard's youngest daughter Jennifer married the distinguished Naval Officer, and later Commodore, Dacre Henry Deudraeth Smyth AO RAN, in Blythswood.⁹⁰ Dacre Smyth became a poet and painter of commendable talent after his retirement from the Navy.

6.21 AE2 Found 1998

AE2 lay undiscovered for 83 years until 1998 when Mr Selçuk Kolay, the director of the Rahmi M Koç Museum in Istanbul, found *AE2* after searching for it and other WWI underwater wrecks for some years. Full details of the expeditions to identify and then explore options about *AE2* are set out on the *AE2* Commemorative Foundation (AE2CF) web site⁹¹ and only a short summary will be included here.

Mr Kolay had worked with an Australian team, including Dr Mark Spencer and Mr Tim Smith, in 1997. They had investigated an earlier underwater discovery by Kolay but it had proved to be a merchant ship with an underwater sonar profile not unlike that of *AE2*. Kolay then found another likely wreck and the combined Australian and Turkish teams mounted an expedition which, in October 1998, dived on it and proved it was indeed the *AE2*. They carried out a preliminary survey of the wreck and ascertained that *AE2* was sitting upright in the mud in the Marmara with the silt about half way up the saddle tanks, but with the propellers and rudder fairly well exposed. The upper conning tower hatch lid, about 73 metres below the surface, was partly open with 'Bunts' a conger eel its inhabitant, and there were numerous fishing nets draped all over the vessel. As the records are unclear on how many torpedoes were loaded and how many fired it was impossible to decide from the historical records whether any were still left in the wreck. As the warhead of a torpedo may well be unstable this was one of the issues that had to be taken into consideration.⁹² Selçuk Kolay was awarded an OAM in the Australian Honours awards in 2000 in recognition of his efforts.⁹³

6.22 AE2 Joint Expedition and Survey 2007

From 1 to 27 September 2007 a further expedition funded by the Australian

government was organised by the AE2CF, the board of which is chaired by Rear Admiral Peter Briggs AO CSC RAN Retd with much of the organising falling to the Secretary, Captain Ken Greig OAM RAN Retd. The Commonwealth government had established a working party in Canberra to coordinate the various government departments and to liaise with the Turkish Government, the meetings of which Briggs and fellow director Commodore Terrence Roach AM RAN Retd regularly attended.

The 2007 expedition was held by AE2CF in conjunction with the Turkish Institute of Nautical Archaeology (TINA) to assess the wreck as a prelude to decisions as to what should be done about its preservation and perhaps recovery. The Australian team comprised 21 people made up of divers, scientists, administrators, documentary film makers and supporters; the TINA team was smaller but composed of people with similar skills. A drop camera was successfully inserted into the upper conning tower hatch and after it had descended to the control room the images showed the interior to be in a reasonable condition and not unlike when the submarine sank. Tests on the accretions on the outer hull by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) showed that the metal was well preserved due to the silt, the low water temperature and oxygen levels.

6.23 Further Joint Expedition and Survey 2014

6.23.1 Project Silent ANZAC

Following an assessment phase completed in 2008, a documented expedition and report was organized by AE2CF and the Turkish authorities in May 2014. The aim was to obtain and then preserve the details of *AE2*'s resting place by a team of Turkish and Australian maritime specialists with expertise in engineering, maritime archaeology, naval history, shipwreck conservation, marine science, and remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROV).

As noted in the subsequent Maritime Archaeology Interim Report written by Tim Smith, the aims of the project were to:

- a. record the physical condition of the internal hull components and aid long-term site preservation,
- b. map the appearance and spatial layout of the internal spaces compared to historic records,

- c. confirm the existence and location of archaeological relics, and document evidence of the crew's life and actions during the loss of the submarine.⁹⁴

The funding for "Project Silent ANZAC" was provided by SeaBotix, DSTO and the Australian government. The company DEEP Offshore was selected to provide all off-shore services. The AE2CF team assembled at Şarköy, Turkey on 7 June 2014 to conduct the maritime archaeological assessment. A three-day mission rehearsal took place so that the Turkish divers could become familiar with the technology being used for the dive. The next day, the ship transporting those involved was positioned above *AE2* ready to lay four mooring buoys in a square around the site to moor the ship precisely over *AE2*, but bad weather intervened.

On the 10 June 2014 the weather was better. The diving support vessel (DSP) was successfully placed and divers captured images of *AE2* noting that no major changes had occurred to its appearance since previous expeditions. During the first dive it initially proved too difficult to drop a camera through the conning tower hatch because it was not open sufficiently as left when the submarine sank in 1915. The Conservation Assessment prepared by Dr Ian D MacLeod of the W.A. Maritime Museum noted that deposits of calcium carbonate had concreted the hatch hinges. Work was done on the problem and finally the hatch opened and a drop camera revealed the control room for the first time since 1915. The divers became very wary of approaching the hatch due to a large conger eel, earlier named 'Bunts', residing in the wreck,⁹⁵ so Bunts was moved to a new home further aft in the submarine.

Between 14 and 17 June, three more ROV camera sweeps of the control room and forward to the torpedo compartment and aft to the beginning of the engine room were completed without the use of any divers. These incursions by the ROV revealed much information about the interior of *AE2* although the visibility in the torpedo compartment was poor due to the large amount of clothing and equipment floating about.

The expedition completed all of its major objectives. Dr Roger Neill of DSTO, author of the Interim Scientific Report, wrote that the data collected will allow for the completion of a computer generated visualization of the interior, and also that the readings conducted on the wreck will prove useful from a corrosion protection perspective. Secondly, with the exception of the forward torpedo space which had restricted visibility, the images taken will improve understanding of the vessel's operations. Indeed, the remarkable state of preservation identifies the submarine as a

time capsule. The Conservation Assessment compiled by Dr Ian MacLeod indicates that the readings taken over the course of the expedition represent the largest in-situ conservation project ever attempted on a historical iron shipwreck.⁹⁶ Thirdly, a cathodic protection system has been installed to stop corrosion of the *AE2* and actively remove chloride ions, which will preserve the vessel.

The navigational buoys moored in place above the *AE2* site will minimise the likelihood of accidental damage but they could attract trophy hunters to the wreck. To reduce this risk a temporary but secure hatch cover was fixed at the top of the conning tower. The Turkish Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications Permits and has been asked to put in place a rule for the creation of a 'no go zone' around the wreck.

It is planned that selected images from the dives will be used for print and visual media to promote the story of *AE2* and *Sultanhisar* in Australia and Turkey. These images will be placed in educational products in Australia, such as the *AE2* graphic novel, study guides, and the planned I-Book. Members of the AE2CF team will undertake further evaluation of the results and prepare a Final Report to be delivered in Istanbul on 20 April 2015, see section 6.24.

6.23.2 Authorised Personnel of Project Silent ANZAC

The following people all contributed to the Project Silent ANZAC discussed above.

NAME	ORGANISATION	ROLE
Peter Briggs	AE2CF	Chairman
Hugh Dolan	AE2CF	Media Management
Bayden Findlay	Sensible Films	Videography
John Gilbert	DSTO	Technical
Peter Graham	DSTO	ROV Operations
Ken Greig	AE2CF	Project Management
Ian Macleod	WA Maritime Museum	Director of Conservation
John Moore	Sensible Films	Film Production
Roger Neill	DSTO	Director of Science
Jesse Rodocker	SeaBotix Inc	ROV Operations
Martin Rowan	DSTO	Technical
Timothy Smith	Heritage Victoria	Director Archaeology
Roger Turner	AE2CF	Project Management
Terence Roach	AE2CF	Director Operations
David Whillas	SeaBotix Australia	ROV Operations
Nigel Erskine	Australian National Maritime Museum	Conservation Management
Frank Shapter	ANMM	Liaison
Alex Dowell	SeaBotix Inc	ROV Operations
Harun Özdas	Dokuz Eylul University	Maritime Archaeology
Nilhan Kizildag	Dokuz Eylul University	Maritime Archaeology
Murat Icel	AE2CF	Project Management
Oguz Kaynak	Sensible Films	Audio Recording
Alp Karabacak	RTN	RTN Liaison
Zülküf Karakus	Canakkale Museum	Maritime Archaeology

6.24 ANZAC Centenary Activities 2015

Having assessed that it had achieved its aims of protecting and preserving *AE2* and telling the story of her brave crew, the AE2CF decided to cease operations on the 100th anniversary of *AE2*'s loss. The Not for Profit company was wound up at the end of Financial Year 2015. Activities during this Centenary year included a Check Survey of the *AE2* site in the Sea of Marmara and an international Closing Conference in Istanbul. The RAN conducted a commemorative ceremony on board HMAS Anzac over the site in the days leading up to the ANZAC commemorations. Finally and most importantly a transition from AE2CF to ANMM, as the body responsible for *AE2* on behalf of the Australian Government and people, was conducted.

The Check Survey and the Closing Conference were key elements in the transition process. The check survey of *AE2*, conducted by the renowned explorer Selçuk Kolay confirmed the efficacy of Protection and Preservation measures taken during MAA14 and increased confidence in plans for future work by ANMM. The Conference facilitated the formation of strategic partnerships between ANMM and Turkish authorities and organisations including the Naval Museum and universities.

Commander Frank Owen superbly orchestrated Project Silent Anzac Closing Conference. The venue, Istanbul Naval Museum, provided not only conference facilities but also a wondrous backdrop of Ottoman Sultan's barges. Opening and closing addresses were given by Admiral Bulent Bostanoğlu, Commander Turkish Naval Forces and the AE2CF Chairman retired Rear Admiral Peter Briggs respectively. Professor Michael White, Mr Selçuk Kolay and Dr Heath Lowry chaired the conference sessions. Speakers included Dr Alex Zelinsky Chief Defence Scientist, Dr Roger Neill, Dr Ian MacLeod, Commodore Terry Roach and Tim Smith; all of whom were directors of Project Silent Anzac and Mr Kevin Sumption Director of ANMM. Australia's Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett was the speaker at the conference dinner.

Descendant family members participated in both the Closing Conference and the commemorative service on board HMAS Anzac, including Gib FitzGibbon (descendant of *AE2* CO, Dacre Stoker), Os Smyth (grandson of *AE2* 1st Lieutenant, Geoffrey Haggard), Mark and Glen Tailby (great grandsons of Tommy Cheater) and John Thomson (grandson of Bunts Thomson). All of who stood on Anzac's flight deck over the site where *AE2* lies, 100 years since she was lost in battle.

Notes To Chapter 6

(Endnotes)

1. H.H.G. Stoker, *Straws in the Wind* 1925, pp.120-1.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
4. Diary of *AE2*, by J. Wheat, p. 13.
5. Stoker, *Straws in the Wind*, *supra*, p.129.
6. There is some discrepancy here between the narratives of Stoker and Wheat as to which events occurred on which days. Stoker's book corroborates his official report, but the odd word and phrase indicate that Stoker may have relied on his official report when writing his book. After all he did not write the report until 1919 and the book until 1923-24, both accounts being written years after the events. The actual events of 26-28 April are substantially in accord with both authors' accounts and it is only the time and sequence of events over these days that are in doubt. Nothing of moment appears to turn upon the discrepancy. In this Chapter Stoker's official report is followed where there is discrepancy.
7. Stoker, *Straws in the Wind*, *supra*, p. 130.
8. The Official Report is reprinted in A.W. Jose, *The Official History of Australia in the War 1914-18*, vol. IX, *The Royal Australian Navy*, p. 246.
9. Stoker, *Straws in the Wind*, *supra*, p. 130.
10. Wheat, *supra*, p. 12.
11. Jose, *The Official History of Australia in the War 1914-18*, *supra*, p. 246.
12. Wheat, *supra*, p. 13.
13. Jose, *The Official History of Australia in the War 1914-18*, *supra*, p. 246.
14. Wheat, *supra*, p. 14.
15. Brown in his diary states that *AE2* sank a transport on this morning, but his is the only account that makes reference to such an incident.
16. Jose, *The Official History*, *supra*, p. 246.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
18. Jose, *The Official History*, *supra*, p. 247. Brown in his diary recorded that *E14* was sighted and pursued by two torpedo-boats. Stoker kept *AE2* on the surface to be sighted and to draw the chase from *E14*.
19. *E14* log book dated 24 March to 4 May 1915 ADM 173/1229 held in British National Archives London, copy held by Darren Brown.
20. Stoker, *Straws in the Wind*, *supra*, p. 137.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
22. Wheat, *supra*, p. 15.
23. Details supplied by the Turkish Government through the Australian Embassy in Turkey, in response to author's request.
24. Stoker, *Straws in the Wind*, *supra*, p. 139.
25. Wheat, *supra*, p. 15.
26. Wheat's Diary of *AE2* records the time as 12.15 p.m., while Stoker's official report records 10.45 a.m. The Turkish account states it was a two-hour engagement and if the action did indeed commence about 10.00 a.m. perhaps Wheat's time is the more likely.
27. The author is indebted to Barrie Downer for his preparation of Appendix IVB.
28. Wheat, *supra*, p. 15.
29. Jose, *The Official History*, *supra*, pp. 247-8.
30. The Basarins had mentioned the *AE2* and her exploits in an earlier book *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story*

by Kevin Fewster, Vecihi Basarin and Hatice Hurmuz Basarin published in 1985 and revised and published in 2003. I am indebted to Vecihi and Hatice Basarin for the copies of their books and also of the other books they have written in giving a Turkish Australian point of view of the Gallipoli ANZAC landings and *AE2*; Kevin Fewster, Vecihi Basarin and Hatice Hurmuz Basarin *A Turkish View of Gallipoli: Canakkale*, 1995 and Hatice Hurmuz Basarin and Vecihi Basarin *The Turks in Australia: Celebrating twenty-five years down under*”, 1993.

31. Vecihi and Hattice Hurmuz Basarin *Beneath the Dardanelles*, supra, p.82 and following.
32. *Ibid.*, p.80.
33. E. Keble Chatterton, *Dardanelles Dilemma*, p. 230.
34. Sir Julian S. Corbett, *History of the Great War. Naval Operations*, vol. III, p. 27.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 32 et seq.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 118. See also Paul F. Kemp, *British Submarines of World War One*.
38. CAO: Dept of Navy; MP 472 File No. 5/19/2520 General Correspondence 1910-21.
39. Corbett, *History of the Great War*, supra, p. 206.
40. Wheat, supra, p. 14.
41. Kemp, *British Submarines of World War One*, Introduction.
42. Corbett, *History of the Great War*; supra, vol. III, p. 20.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 308-9.
44. Kemp, *British Submarines of World War One*.
45. Richard Compton-Hall, supra, p.189.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
47. *Two Low Ships*, p. 172. Quoted in Keble Chatterton, *Dardanelles Dilemma*.
48. Cited in Richard Compton-Hall, supra, p.189.
49. CAO, supra, MP 472.
50. *Ibid.*, MP 472/1 File No. 5/19/2520.
51. Wheat, supra, p. 16.
52. Stoker, *Straws in the Wind*, supra, p. 143.
53. Fred and Elizabeth Brenchley, *Stoker's Submarine: Anzac Centenary Edition*, 2014, p.128.
54. Wheat, supra, p. 21.
55. Holbrook's brother was the second captain of HMAS *Canberra* and became Commodore Commanding the Australian Squadron in the period 1930-32. The later RADM G.G.O. Gatacre RAN was his Flag Lieutenant, *Naval Historical Bulletin*, vol. 7, No. 10, June 1977.
56. Wheat, supra, p. 21.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 25
58. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 27
60. For a record of his work, see H. Morganthau, *Secrets of the Bosphorus*.
61. Stoker, *Straws in the Wind*, supra, p. 281.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 310 et seq.
63. CAO, supra, MP 472 File No. 5/18/8646.
64. *Ibid.*, MP 472/1 File No. 5/19/2520 General Correspondence 1910-21.
65. *Ibid.*, MP 472/1 File No. 5/19/2520 General Correspondence 1910-21.
66. *Ibid.*, MP 472 File No. 5/20/1039.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Ibid.* Knaggs's War Service medals were donated by his family to the Australian Submarine Historical Collection, located at HMAS *Platypus*, Sydney and now held by the RAN Heritage Centre collection.
69. Wheat, supra, p. 38.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 53. PO Cecil Bray by letter dated 12 January 1919 also reported that his disappearance from hospital was mysterious. CAO: Dept of Navy, Navy Office Secretariat; MP 472/1 File No. 5/20/10349 General Correspondence 1910-21.
71. CAO, *supra*, MP 472/1 File No. 5/20/10349.
72. Brown in his Diary of *AE2* wrote out a list of prisoners who died to his knowledge. Those of the submariners were: AB Barter, *E15*, July 13 Chief Stoker; Charles Varcoe, *AE2*, September 18 [18 September 1916]; PO Gilbert, *AE2*, September 26 [9 October 1916]; ERA Coates, *E7*, October 2; Stoker Williams, *AE2*, October 6 [29 September 1916]; AB Knaggs, *AE2*, October 10 [22 October 1916]; Chief Stoker Taylor, *E7*, October 15 and Stoker 1st Class Mitchell, *E15*, in Brown's Diary November 26. (It seems that all dates refer to the year 1916.) The dates of death shown in brackets are not from the Diary but from records now held in the Navy Heritage Collection, Sydney.
73. Wheat, *supra*, p. 67.
74. CAO, MP 472 File No. 5/19/2825.
75. Supplement (No. 31303) to the London Gazette of Friday 22 April 1919; Citation on Page 5113
76. Supplement to the London Gazette dated 17 October 1919.
77. Richard Compton-Hall, *supra*, p.171.
78. Fred and Elizabeth Brenchley, *Stoker's Submarine*, *supra*, p.138,
79. Stoker, *Straws in the Wind*, *supra*.
80. *Naval Historical Review*, June 1975, p. 28. Note by LCDR W.O.C. Roberts, RAN.
81. *Stoker's Submarine*, *supra*, p.141.
82. *Ibid.* pp.142-150.
83. *Ibid.* p.150.
84. Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal, Reports, 2013; web site: <http://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Valour-Inquiry-Acceptance-of-the-Tribunals-recommendations1.pdf>.
85. *The Long Silence: The Story of G.A.G Haggard of Submarine AE2*, Jennifer Smyth, 2007, 48.
86. *Ibid.*
87. Brenchley, *supra*, 164
88. *Ibid.*
89. Jennifer Smyth, *supra*, pp.58-59.
90. *Ibid.*, pp.133.
91. *AE2* Commemorative Foundation web site <http://ae2.org.au>.
92. Mr Vicihi Basarin, an Australian of Turkish background, also played a part in the *AE2* expeditions to Turkey: see Kevin Fewster, Vecihi Basarin and Hatice Hurmuz Basarin *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story*, 1985 and republished 2003, p.148 and following; Kevin Fewster, Vicihi Basarin and Hatice Hurmuz Basarin *A Turkish View of Gallipoli: Canakkale*, 1995; Selçuk Kolyay "Finding the *AE2*", *The Sydney Papers*, 9 November 2000, The Sydney Institute, Vol 13, No.1, Summer 2001; pp.26-27; web site www.thesydneyinstitute.com.au.
93. Government Honours web site www.itsanhonor.gov.au.
94. *AE2* Maritime Archaeological Assessment Interim Report 2014, Archaeological Report, Annex D, D-1.
95. *Ibid.*, Operations Diary and Photo Log, Annex B, B-1.
96. *Ibid.*, Condition Assessment of the *AE2*, Annex E, E-1